O Post da Dra. Rita Maltez no blog de Corporate Governance da Abreu Advogados, “O Governo das Sociedades” chama a atenção para um paper que foi referido no The Economist e cujo um dos autores é o Dr. Pedro Matos. Este paper faz uma reflexão sobre este tema, actualíssimo e na ordem do dia:
“Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings cast doubt on whether regulatory changes that increase shareholder activism and monitoring by outside directors will be effective in reducing the consequences of future economic crises.”
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